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Abstract
Although our subjective impression is of a richly detailed visual world, numerous empirical results 
suggest that the amount of visual information observers can perceive and remember at any given 
moment is limited. How can our subjective impressions be reconciled with these objective 
observations? Here, we answer this question by arguing that, although we see more than the 
handful of objects, claimed by prominent models of visual attention and working memory, we still 
see far less than we think we do. Taken together, we argue that these considerations resolve the 
apparent conflict between our subjective impressions and empirical data on visual capacity, while 
also illuminating the nature of the representations underlying perceptual experience.
Perception: Rich or Sparse?
The moment we open our eyes, we experiences a vast, richly detailed visual world extending 
well into the periphery [1,2]. However, numerous experimental results indicate that the 
bandwidth of human perception is severely limited. Findings from change blindness and 
inattentional blindness demonstrate that much of the available visual information goes 
unnoticed [3]. Direct estimates of the capacity of visual attention (see Glossary) and 
working memory reveal that surprisingly few items can be processed and maintained at once 
[4,5]. These results raise a natural question: why do we think we see so much when the 
scientific evidence suggests we see so little?
One answer to this question is that change blindness and inattentional blindness highlight the 
limits of mechanisms such as attention and working memory, rather than the limits of 
conscious perception. According to this view, perception ‘overflows’ and exceeds the 
capacity of the cognitive mechanisms needed to access that information [6]. In other words, 
we consciously perceive more than we can attend, remember, report, or base decisions on 
[7–11]. Under this view, the neural processes associated with visual awareness are separate 
from those associated with attention, working memory, and explicit report. Recurrent 
processing in sensory cortex supports conscious perception [10], whereas the parietal and 
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prefrontal cortices support the cognitive mechanisms involved in accessing those percepts 
[12]. According to this framework, there is no tension between our subjective impression of 
the world and objective measures of human capacity limits because both of these are true. 
We have a rich experience of the world that cannot be fully captured by the capacity-limited 
cognitive mechanisms beyond the canonical visual system.
However, contrary to this view, many researchers argue that awareness is intrinsically linked 
to these cognitive functions and information is not consciously perceived until it is accessed 
by higher-order systems, such as attention, working memory, and decision-making [13–18]. 
Rather than link conscious perception with recurrent processing in sensory cortex, this view 
associates awareness with the parietal and prefrontal cortices [14]. However, for those who 
endorse this view, the problem remains: how can our impression of a rich visual experience 
be supported by mechanisms that have strict capacity limits? Put another way, it has been 
claimed that ‘Introspectively, consciousness seems rich in content…From the third-person 
perspective of the behavioral scientist, however, consciousness is rather miserable’ ([10] p. 
205).
We argue here that, even though conscious perception is limited by cognitive mechanisms 
such as attention and working memory [3], it is not ‘rather miserable’, and the visual 
information observers have access to is not at all sparse. To make this argument, we discuss 
a variety of recent results demonstrating that people can encode and remember considerably 
more than just a few items. First, we examine empirical findings from a relatively new field 
of study: visual ensembles and summary statistics [19]. The key idea here is that the visual 
system exploits the redundancy found in real-world scenes to represent a large amount of 
information, often extending into the visual periphery, as a single summary statistic [20]. 
Critically, standard models of attention and working memory largely ignore ensemble 
representations, focusing instead on the representation of individual items [21–25]. Once 
ensembles and summary statistics are taken into consideration, it quickly becomes clear that 
observers have access to different aspects of the entire field of view, not just a handful of 
items.
In addition, we also discuss the idea that neural structures within the visual system involved 
in representing visual scenes and ensemble statistics [26,27] comprise a unique neural 
channel that is partially separate from other processing channels [28,29]. These results 
suggest that the visual system is functionally organized to allow for scene and ensemble 
representations to be efficiently formed somewhat independently of other object 
representations. In other words, there appear to be separate neural pathways for representing 
the forest and the trees.
Together, these findings help reconcile the apparent tension between our subjective 
impression of a rich visual world and empirical results highlighting the limits of visual 
cognition. We argue that the apparent richness of visual experience can be captured without 
having to dissociate consciousness from higher-level cognitive functions and without 
arguing that visual awareness overflows cognitive access.
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The Limits of Visual Cognition
Two paradigms that have had a major role in demonstrating the limits of visual cognition are 
change blindness and inattentional blindness. Change blindness is the inability to detect a 
change between two different pictures when a brief interruption occurs between the two 
images [30,31] or the change occurs so gradually that it does not automatically draw 
attention [32]. By contrast, inattentional blindnessis the failure to notice an otherwise visible 
stimulus when attention is directed elsewhere. In perhaps the most famous example, 
participants failed to notice a man in a gorilla costume walking through the middle of a 
scene when attention was focused on people passing a basketball [33]. Perhaps more 
commonly, automobile accidents regularly occur because drivers fail to notice items on the 
road (e.g., another car or a pedestrian) when their attention is directed elsewhere (e.g., their 
cell phone conversation) [34,35]. Despite differences in methodologies, both change 
blindness and inattentional blindness arise because of observers’ limited ability to attend to 
and remember more than a few items at a time.
Although these paradigms clearly demonstrate the limits of visual cognition, more targeted 
studies have characterized the architecture and capacities of visual attention and working 
memory. Both of these processes are limited by a finite supply of some mental commodity 
[36]. This commodity is often characterized as either a fixed number of ‘slots’ [4,22–24] or 
a fluid cognitive resource [21,37,38]. Despite the differences between these models, they 
both converge on the idea that observers can store around three or four items in working 
memory. In terms of visual attention, initial studies estimated that around three or four 
locations can be attended at once [39,40], but more recent efforts have pushed that number 
closer to around seven or eight [25,41]. However, even eight attended locations is still not 
sufficient to explain the richness of perception.
In isolation, these results seem to imply that awareness is limited to only a handful of items 
at a given moment. However, even when attention is entirely focused on a single item, no 
one has the impression that the rest of the world fades into darkness (Figure 1). Instead, 
observers believe they have a rich perceptual experience that spans the entire field of view. 
This belief has been experimentally verified by the fact that naïve observers systematically 
overestimate the capacities of attention and working memory [42,43]. At first blush, these 
results challenge the idea that the contents of visual awareness are the same as the contents 
of mechanisms such as attention and working memory [13–18]. How can such limited 
processes ever capture the richness of perceptual experience?
Ensemble Statistics and the Capacity of Perception
The visual world does not comprise random bits of uncorrelated information; it has 
structure, regularity, and redundancy [44–46]. The visual system takes advantage of this fact 
by representing groups of items as a statistic that summarizes different types of information 
(Box 1). These ensemble representations, or summary statistics, are formed by collapsing 
across the measurements of individual items to form a singular description of the group. 
Although items that are not focally attended are represented with poor resolution, averaging 
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across these imprecise representations allows the system to obtain an accurate measure of 
the entire group [20].
Box 1
Ensembles and Summary Statistics
What kind of information can be represented as an ensemble? Earlier studies focused on 
low-level visual dimensions, such as average orientation [101], brightness [102], speed of 
motion [103], and size [104]. These findings were then extended into higher-level 
dimensions, such as facial emotion, gender [105], and identity [106], as well as eye gaze 
[107] and biological motion [108]. Many of these dimensions can be processed 
remarkably fast (i.e., with ~50 ms presentation time) [104,109] and formed by integrating 
representations over time [110,111], providing observers with a rapidly updated summary 
of a variety of dimensions across the visual world.
Ensemble perception is not limited to the laboratory and is pervasive throughout everyday 
life. Imagine walking down a busy street with a crowd of people moving towards you. It 
would be computationally taxing to examine every object on the street or proceed person 
by person to determine each individual’s facial expression, direction of motion, and gait. 
Given the inherent structure in the scene, a vast amount of this information spanning a 
wide expanse of visual space can be represented as an ensemble, or average. 
Representing information in this way allows observers to quickly determine whether the 
people are approaching in a threatening manner (e.g., moving quickly, in a converging 
direction, with angry facial expressions) or a nonthreatening manner (e.g., moving 
slower, in multiple directions, with neutral facial expressions). This is just one of many 
examples of how ensemble perception can enable efficient coding of relevant information 
as observers navigate the world despite processing limitations.
How does representing multiple items as an ensemble help resolve the tension between our 
subjective impression of a rich visual experience versus objective measurements of limited 
perception? We argue that items that are attended to and foveated are perceived at a higher 
resolution, while items that unattended or are in the periphery are primarily perceived as 
being part of an ensemble [47]. Observers are aware not only of a handful of items but also 
of the entire scene, but they only perceive a subset of the scene at high resolution. Standard 
demonstrations of change blindness and inattentional blindness succeed because the critical 
change often preserves the summary statistics of the scene. When those statistics are 
violated, it is considerably easier to notice the changes in a scene [48–50]. Detecting 
changes in these statistics is easy because observers do not perceive a small subset of the 
items in a scene; they perceive some information about all of the items in the form of 
ensemble statistics across several dimensions (Figure 1).
One of the cleanest demonstrations of this idea comes from a study in which participants 
performed a change detection task in which one of 25 colored items could change color 
(e.g., from red to blue) and participants simply indicated whether change occurred [51]. 
Performance was measured as a function of the statistical regularity of the display, which 
varied across trials. If observers can attend to, perceive, and remember only a handful of 
Cohen et al. Page 4
Trends Cogn Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 May 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
items (around three or four), performance should remain constant regardless of the changes 
to the structural configurations of the display. However, if observers are able to perceive the 
overall structure of the display, performance on the task should vary as a function of higher-
order regularities. The results from this study unambiguously supported the latter prediction. 
When the display had little structure, standard estimates of working memory capacity [52] 
indicated that only around 4.5 items were successfully held in memory. However, when 
more structure was added to the display, an estimated 24 items were held in memory, six 
times the standard estimate of working memory capacity (Figure 2, top row). Furthermore, 
the authors modeled this change detection task using Bayesian inference. The results of this 
modeling suggest that observers encoded a few individual items along with a summary of 
the statistics of the entire display (see also [53–55]).
Ensemble Statistics and Natural Scenes
Ensemble statistics are useful not only for the simple stimulus displays typical of working 
memory paradigms, but also because probably they serve as the foundation of scene 
perception more broadly. Low-level features, such as luminance, orientation, and spatial 
frequency, are combined to form higher-order representations [56] that are sufficient for the 
classification of scenes (e.g., mountain, highway, or beach) [57]. As long as certain statistics 
of the scene are preserved (e.g., spatial contours, texture densities, etc.), the category of a 
scene can be extracted even when the individual objects it contains can no longer be 
perceived [58] (Figure 3). The importance of summary statistics has also been demonstrated 
with computational models that categorize scenes based solely on texture statistics [59]. 
Finally, in addition to carrying information about the identity of a scene, these basic 
statistics are informative enough for observers to recognize other aspects of a scene, such as 
its openness, symmetry, complexity, and depth [60,61].
Ensemble statistics also likely have a key role in enabling observers to form scene 
representations extremely quickly. These representations are formed so fast that observers 
can perceive a great deal of information from a single eye fixation, without making saccades 
[62]. When looking at a scene, fixations typically last 275–300 ms [63,64]. In that time, 
observers can extract the gist of the scene [65] and a few larger objects in the scene [66]. 
Even with an exposure duration of 50–100 ms, observers can still report the gist of a scene 
and extract a variety of properties, such as the depth, navigability, openness, and the 
temperature of the scene [67–70].
Together, these studies show that, within a single glance, observers do not merely have 
access to a small handful of isolated items in a sea of nothingness; they have access to a 
tremendous amount of information spanning the entire scene. The ability to extract an 
almost immediate sense of the visual world provides ecological benefits, such as guiding 
further action, especially saccades. Saccades are important to this discussion because one 
reason why observers may overestimate their perceptual experience is that saccades are so 
effortless that observers often do not even realize that they are making them [71]. This gives 
people the false impression that they perceive more than they actually do in a given instant 
because they are not aware of the serial manner in which they accrue information (i.e., one 
saccade after another). Furthermore, observers do not move their eyes randomly across a 
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scene; they systematically go to the parts of the scene that are most informative for the task 
at hand [72]. This ability to select saccade targets intelligently is possible because observers 
are able to take advantage of the knowledge they have obtained about the scene from its 
global image statistics [73–75]. Thus, the use of summary statistics in scene perception not 
only gives observers an immediate sense of the visual world, but also provides a foundation 
for further exploration.
Finally, we speculate that, in addition to recognizing basic perceptual aspects of the world in 
a single glance, observers can also quickly perceive higher-level aspects of the scene, such 
as its physical, social, and action-based properties. For example, we do not see just a cup and 
a table, but a cup resting on a table, and we compute the reaching and grasping motion that 
would be required to take a sip from the cup. When seeing people in a scene, we quickly 
perceive their social characteristics and actions (e.g., are these two people interacting with 
each other or not?). If these inferences are made efficiently, it may due to specialized cortical 
machinery that helps imbue real-world perception with rich semantic content far beyond the 
mere identities of objects and scenes. Whether and how these high-level inferences bypass 
the standard processing bottlenecks of vision is an important and largely unanswered 
question for future research (see Outstanding Questions).
Outstanding Questions
How are ensemble statistics represented in the brain? Are they formed across the same 
circuits involved in representing individual items? Or do noisy representations of 
individual items have to be read out by a higher-order node that forms a new, ensemble 
representation?
What are the attentional requirements of ensemble perception? Is it possible for ensemble 
statistics to be rendered inattentionally blind or go unnoticed due to the attentional blink? 
What type of attention is needed for ensemble perception? Can multiple statistics, 
summarizing different dimensions of the scene (i.e., average color, orientation, size, etc.), 
be established in parallel?
To what extent is ensemble perception used across sensory modalities besides vision? Do 
the same principles discovered in vision apply to other modalities?
Are higher-level social, physical, and action-based properties of scenes extracted 
quickly? Is different neural tissue engaged in extracting each of these kinds of 
information? To what extent does the subjective richness of perception result from the 
overlay of these higher-level physical, social, and action-based properties of a scene?
Neural Mechanisms of Scene and Ensemble Perception
While the speed and efficiency of natural scene and ensemble perception is well known and 
incorporated into many cognitive models [76,77], the neural mechanisms supporting this 
ability have only begun to be understood. A series of recent studies all converge on the idea 
that the gist and statistics of a scene are perceived so efficiently because we have neural 
structures specifically involved in representing those particular visual dimensions [78]. The 
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parahippocampal place area (PPA), restrosplenical cortex (RSC), and occipital place area 
(OPA) are selectively and causally involved in recognizing the identity, layout, and 
navigability of scenes [79–81]. In addition, some of these neural regions, particularly PPA, 
appear to have a prominent role in representing a variety of ensemble and statistical 
properties (e.g., texture) [27,82,83].
The neural structures that are sensitive to scenes and ensemble statistics appear to be at least 
partially separate from the structures involved in representing other visual categories, such 
as faces, bodies, and objects. For example, neuropsychological studies have shown perserved 
texture and scene perception, but impaired object perception, in a patient with bilateral 
damage to lateral occipital cortex, an area of the brain that responds selectively to shape and 
object stimuli [84,85]. Conversely, a patient with damage to parahippocampal cortex had 
impaired scene recognition abilities and could only recognize scenes because of a prominent 
visual object (e.g., a house) [86]. Furthermore, behavioral and neural evidence from normal 
observers suggests that both scene and ensemble perception draw upon pools of cognitive 
resources that are distinct from pools supporting object perception [28,29,87]. One recent 
study found that more information could be processed when it was distributed across 
multiple neural regions (e.g., two faces and two scenes) compared with when it relied on a 
single neural region (e.g., four faces) [28] (Figure S1 in the supplemental information 
online). Thus, the visual system appears to be organized so that the representations of 
scenes, and potentially the representations of ensemble statistics, are formed with minimal 
interference from other objects. Having dedicated neural structures for these particular visual 
dimensions potentially has an important role in the ability to construct a richly detailed 
percept from a single glance.
Do Observers Have Access to all of this Information?
Those who believe that visual awareness overflows the capacities of attention, working 
memory, and other higher-level cognitive processes [7–11] may claim that the ensemble 
statistics described here are in fact prominent examples of such overflow. In fact, a recent 
study claimed that one particular statistic, color diversity, could be perceived ‘cost free’ and 
required no attention or working-memory resources [8]. Are ensemble statistics and scene 
representations truly ‘cost free’? If this is true, ensembles and scenes should be immune to 
all types of attentional interference. Performing a demanding attentional task (e.g., visual 
search or working memory) should have no impact on the ability to perceive ensemble 
statistics or a natural scene.
In reality, numerous pieces of evidence suggest that some type of attention is needed to 
process and perceive ensembles and scenes. It has repeatedly been shown that natural scenes 
can go unnoticed because of inattentional blindness [3] or the attentional blink [88]. 
Furthermore, the ability to classify the gist of a scene suffers in dual-task situations [89]. In 
terms of ensemble statistics, one recent study found that processing the statistics of a group 
of objects requires as much attention as processing an individual object [90]. This finding is 
consistent with earlier studies claiming that an ensemble takes up approximately the same 
amount of space in working memory as an individual object [91–93]. In addition, observers 
are more accurate at processing multiple ensembles when they are presented sequentially, 
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rather than simultaneously [94,95], suggesting that ensembles compete for limited cognitive 
resources. Finally, the precision of ensemble representations varies as a function of the 
allocation of attention (i.e., focused versus distribute) [96]. Together, these results suggest 
that, although ensemble statistics are processed quickly and efficiently [47], they are not 
perceived ‘cost free.’ However, this is a relatively new research question and future work 
will need to examine this issue with different paradigms and tasks (see Outstanding 
Questions).
Can these Mechanisms Explain the Richness of Experience?
Those who believe that visual awareness overflows mechanisms, such as attention and 
working memory, might say that our expanded notion of what observers can access still does 
not account for the richness of experience. One classic kind of evidence in support of the 
overflow argument comes from the partial report paradigms [97,98]. In these studies, 
participants encode items into working memory and are then quickly cued as to which 
particular items they should report. When cued in this way, performance is near ceiling. 
However, when no cue occurs, and participants must report the entire set, performance is 
worse. This finding has been cited as evidence of information overflowing cognitive access 
[6,10]. However, other researchers argue that the cue simply elevates previously unconscious 
information to consciousness [15,16]. Currently, there is no clear, uncontroversial way to 
empirically distinguish these interpretations, and so we focus the rest of our discussion on 
other types of information that may overflow access.
Even after considering ensemble statistics and scene perception, some people may still have 
the intuition that observers can see more than attention and working memory can capture. 
However, without clear empirical evidence to support this claim, it appears to be based 
purely on intuition. Should we trust this intuition? It is well established that observers 
systematically overestimate the richness of their own perception. People often believe that 
detecting changes in a change blindness experiment will be easy, and are surprised to find 
out that it is not [42,43]. Similarly, people do not realize how bad their acuity and color 
perception is in the periphery [1]. Box 2 presents two simple exercises that directly test the 
extent to which people are mistaken about their own perceptual experience.
Box 2
How to Demonstrate that Perception Is Not as Rich as it Seems
First, ask a participant how close a playing card has to be to the center of their field of 
vision for them to determine the identity of the card (e.g., ten of clubs versus seven of 
spades). Have the participant hold his arms up to visualize an approximate estimate of his 
answer (Figure IA). Next, to show the participant the actual answer, tell him to extend his 
arm to the side (~90° from fixation). Put a card in his hand facing him, but make sure that 
he keeps looking forward and does not glance at the card. Then, tell him to keep the card 
at arm’s length and slowly move it in to the center of his field of view. Tell him to stop 
moving the card as soon as he is sure he can identify the card. If done correctly, it will 
become clear on the first trial that people wildly underestimate how close the card has to 
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be to fixation for them to identify it. In many cases, participants will spontaneously laugh 
once they realize how far off they were with their prediction.
For the second demonstration, ask a participant to hold his fixation on a random object. 
Grab a colored object that fits in your hand (e.g., an orange). Slowly move your hand 
from the participant’s periphery to the center of his field of view (Figure IB). Make sure 
to emphasize that he keep staring straight ahead. As you move your hand towards the 
center, jiggle it a little bit. Tell the participant to say ‘Stop’ as soon as he detects any 
motion in their periphery. Really emphasize that, as soon as he senses any peripheral 
motion, he should tell you immediately. Once he says stop, jiggle the object for a moment 
longer and confirm that he sees peripheral motion. If you want to confirm that he sees 
something, move your hand up/down and ask the participant to say which direction your 
hand moved. Once you are both convinced he can see the peripheral motion, ask him to 
tell you the color of the object. He will almost certainly say he does not know and if you 
force him to give you an answer, he will just guess. Do this a multiple times and you will 
see that people are: (i) no better than chance at guessing the color of the object; and (ii) 
surprised by how unable they are to report the color.
Cohen et al. Page 9
Trends Cogn Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 May 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Figure I. 
Two Demonstrations Highlighting the Extent to which People Overestimate their 
Perceptual Experience.
What these exercises show is that it is easy to be wrong about the richness of perception, and 
scientists should be skeptical about claims that observers can see more than can be accessed. 
Instead, the claim that visual awareness overflows cognitive access must be supported by 
specific examples of visual input that can be consciously perceived without being attended, 
held in working memory, reported, or used to guide volitional action. Without specific 
evidence, there appears no good scientific reason to believe consciousness overflows 
cognition.
Concluding Remarks: Reconsidering the Focus of Consciousness 
Research
Many researchers have claimed that information cannot be consciously perceived without 
being accessed by higher-level cognitive functions, such as attention and working memory 
[13–18]. This view has been criticized for its inability to capture the richness of perceptual 
experience, given the strict capacity limits of these mechanisms evident in phenomena such 
as change blindness and inattentional blindness [7–11]. Critics of this view say that those 
who claim information must be accessed to be conscious believe that ‘conscious perception 
is limited to the contents of visual working memory, roughly three or four things at a time in 
many standard paradigms’ ([99] p. 445).
To the contrary, we argue that observers have access to considerably more information than 
just three or four items at a time. Instead, a handful of items are perceived with high fidelity, 
while the remainder of the world is represented as an ensemble statistic (or set of statistics). 
Those who link consciousness with higher-level cognitive function [13–18] need not believe 
that perception is sparse, with observers seeing only a few items at a time. Perception is 
undoubtedly rich, but this richness can be easily captured by cognitive mechanisms, such as 
attention and working memory. The focus of consciousness research should be on the nature 
of the visual information that is captured beyond the few high-fidelity objects that can be 
held in visual working memory, the nature and number of such summary statistics, and the 
capacity limits entailed in their extraction and representation.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Glossary
Attention the process of selecting some bits of information for 
further processing at the expense of others (e.g., 
attending to the sound of a lecturer’s voice and ignoring 
the street noise outside)
Awareness the ability to consciously perceive, feel, or experience 
certain sensory events
Bayesian inference a method of statistical inference that uses Bayes’ 
theorem to update the probability for a hypothesis as 
more information and/or evidence becomes available
Ensembles and summary statisticsthe representation of multiple items in the world as a 
single, average descriptor of the whole set (e.g., the 
average size of a collection of objects)
Gist of the scene the basic perceptual (i.e., color, etc.) and conceptual (i.e., 
semantic label, etc.) representations of a scene that 
observers can comprehend in a single glance
Recurrent processing corticocortical interactions between neural regions in 
which information is transmitted from higher-level 
regions back to lower-level regions (e.g., from higher-
level cortex back to early visual cortex)
Saccades quick movements of the eyes that change the point of 
fixation
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Trends
Numerous empirical results highlight the limits of visual perception, attention, and 
working memory. However, it intuitively feels as though we have a rich perceptual 
experience, leading many to claim that conscious perception overflows these limited 
cognitive mechanisms.
A relatively new field of study (visual ensembles and summary statistics) provides 
empirical support for the notion that perception is not limited and that observers have 
access to information across the entire visual world.
Ensemble statistics, and scene processing in general, also appear to be supported by 
neural structures that are distinct from those supporting object perception. These distinct 
mechanisms can work partially in parallel, providing observers with a broad perceptual 
experience.
Moreover, new demonstrations show that perception is not as rich as is intuitively 
believed. Thus, ensemble statistics appear to capture the entirety of perceptual 
experience.
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Figure 1. An Approximate Visualization of a Snapshot of Visual Perception
The red crosses represent the fixation spot and the focus of attention for these particular 
snapshots. The left column shows two images that have not been doctored in any way (left 
column, ‘Original image’). The middle column shows how the world does not fade into 
darkness when it is not fixated or focally attended. Instead, the right column shows how the 
parts of the world that are not fixated and unattended are represented as an ensemble 
statistic. These images were initially created using a texture synthesis model that preserves a 
variety of low-level statistics within a series of pooling regions similar to those of receptive 
fields [100]. In addition, these images are also shown through a circular Gaussian aperture 
so that the coloring of the images gradually disappears towards the periphery.
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Figure 2. Change Blindness Demonstrations Are often Cited as Evidence that Perception Is 
Limited to just a few Items
The left two columns show five examples of displays in which detecting the change between 
them is difficult. However, the right two columns show five examples of displays in which 
detecting the change is trivially easy. Critically, the amount of change on each row is 
identical in both the left and right image pairs. The changes on each row are: (i) a red dot 
changes to a blue dot; (ii) a color changes by 90° on the color wheel; (iii) a blue oval rotates 
90°; (iv) a spoon changes into a tea cup; and (v) the red bowling pin changes location. The 
key point is that, when the changes between the displays preserve certain statistics (left 
columns), the change is hard to notice. However, when the changes violate those statistics 
(right column), the change is easy to notice and highlights the vast amount of information 
observers have access to at a given instant.
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Figure 3. Visualizations of How Many Aspects of a Scene Can Be Conveyed by only a Few Basic 
Image Statistics
Each of these images was generated by taking the original images and preserving certain 
global statistics in nonoverlapping windows [112].
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